Some time ago, I posted a small C++ program that decompresses the source code stored in table REPOSRC
(⇒ check this article).
It was never intended to be more than a proof of concept, but since many people showed interest in it (and found bugs), I decided to create a GitHub repository:
It contains the history of my ancient CVS repository (converted thanks to this great how-to).
So… if you find any bugs or want to help improve it — please go there and either create an issue or simply fork it and unleash the developer in you).
In this article, we'll take a look at a potential weakness that is often considered minor and thus underrated – but might still be used to lever out important security measures: parameter transactions.
They basically execute another tcode… along with pre-defined screen input – the "parameters".
For example, the transaction code SM30_PRGN_CUST is a shortcut to SM30 for the maintenance view PRGN_CUST:
When you call it, SM30 is executed and table PRGN_CUST is opened in maintenance mode. Since the option "Skip initial screen" is enabled, it jumps directly into the table maintenance view itself – if it was disabled, one would be able to override the given screen options in the SM30 dynpro… including the table name! That's the point where the weakness starts.
Now let's select some more parameter transactions from table TSTCP.
They start with either "/*" or "/N" — the first one skips the called tcode's initial screen, the latter one doesn't.
Below you can find the selection options for all SE38 parameter transactions:
Now let's have a look at the lines marked red and green in our result:
The first one – SE38L – is unsafe, because the "/N" indicates that the SE38 selection screen is just filled out – but the report name can be overridden easily.
This means that SE38L is equivalent to SE38
Well… for SE38L, -M, -N this might not be a big surprise, but what about RBDCPCLR? … I never would have guessed!
The second sample – SE38N – calls SE38 and executes report RDELALOG immediately: nothing to see here, move along.
- When you limit access to a transaction, always keep in mind that insecure parameter transactions might represent a backdoor.
- Customer parameter transactions should always use the "Skip initial screen" option.
See you soon!
User and authorization administration in the Java stack is a pain in the neck – that's a fact! The identity management tools are inferior as compared to the ABAP stack, but nevertheless there are ways to make your life a bit easier…
Mass user maintenance in the UME
When it comes to mass user creation/modification in the Java UME (database only, no ABAP- or LDAP-data source), no tool like SU10 exists and many admins choose the hard way of creating users one by one... but wait... the "Identity Management" screen has an "Import" button:
Standard Format for UME imports
The screen behind that "Import" button provides not much more than a text field, which needs to be populated with user master data in the correct format (btw.: the amount of importable data is limited to 1 MiB).
The import format is documented here, but SAP provides no easy solution to create data in that format.
This is – you probably guessed it – the point, where my solution comes in.
Generally speaking, the "Standard Format" – as SAP calls it – is similar to the format of many .ini files and thus quite simple.
It can be used to create and modify users, groups, and roles — for users, a typical import record looks like this:
Squeeze mass user data into the Standard Format
For this task, I've prepared a very simple Excel file for you… download it here:
You can insert the user name, first and last name, password and up to three roles for up to 100 users into column A-G.
The formula in column H generates the expected format from the input data.
When finished, simply mark the cells in column H starting from line 2 (i.e. without the header).
Unfortunately, Excel is a very smart tool and automagically inserts quotation marks around the copied cells.
You need to remove these quote signs manually from the copied data…
Alternatively, you can also copy the clipboard's contents into an empty Word document, then copy everything again – that way the quotes are removed, too.
Afterwards, paste the data into the text area on the Import screen of the Identity Management; then click "Upload".
The protocol on the next screen contains information about the import result.
See you next time!
Recently I wrote an article for a magazine published by the German-language SAP users group (DSAG).
In this post, I’d like to share an English translation with you (the original German version is available here: http://blaupause.dsag.de/berechtigungstrace-mit-komfort-funktion).
Authorization trace with comfort function:
One of the numerous new features of Enhancement Package 6 is the authorization trace via transaction STAUTHTRACE. In principle, it works like the system trace ST01, but is limited to authorization checks. This makes it a valuable tool for authorization admins and provides comfortable functions.
So far, it was necessary to start an authorization trace on all application servers of a system separately, unless the relevant server was known beforehand. Transaction STAUTHTRACE simplifies this and allows starting a trace on one or more servers in a single step:
Without an explicit selection, the system-wide trace is automatically started on all available servers:
The evaluation section in the lower half of the screen offers detailed options to analyze the result and is much advanced in comparison to ST01.
In a system-wide trace, the selection of the application server in the topmost section is also taken into account.
The option "Evaluate Extended Passport" is extremely handy, as it enriches the trace result with data from the system's kernel statistics (transaction STAD).
This additional information is helpful when it comes to RFC calls from other systems and consists of the following fields:
- "Initial Component" — the calling system, instance and client
- "Action Type" — e.g. a batch job run or a transaction call
- "Initial Action" — e.g. the name of the job or transaction code
The result is finally displayed in a nice, filterable ALV grid and not in that ugly ST01 list view.
Additionally, it is possible to dive into each line and jump to the affected user, the authorization object and its documentation as well as the line in the source code that triggered the authorization check. Simply double-click in the list or use the menu:
How to use the trace result in PFCG
The result of an authorization trace can be used in PFCG directly now - no matter, whether it comes from STAUTHTRACE or the traditional ST01.
This can be achieved in two ways:
- Maintenance via the role menu
The "Import from Trace" option in a role's "Menu" tab allows importing the called applications from the trace: Transactions (S_TCODE), External- or Web-Services (S_SERVICE) and RFC Function Modules (S_RFC).
Unfortunately, if you import a transaction call, only the tcode is adopted from the trace - the other values that are checked during transaction start and execution are ignored; instead, the suggested values from SU24 are used.
- Maintenance of authorization values
In the role's authorization data maintenance screen, the new button "Trace" can be used to import the values that were checked from the result into the role.
In the below example, the role already contains the object S_USER_GRP – but no values yet. The actual check in this case used 02 for the field ACTVT and the user group (CLASS) was "SUPER" – these values can easily be imported from the trace data with some clicks.
The new trace functionality of EhP 6 is a great feature for the analysis of authorization needs and problems - a neat enhancement of the existing toolbox!
A few months passed since my last post – so it's about time for new one!
User name as a code condition
The system field SY-UNAME contains the name of the currently logged-on user and is quite frequently used by developers to facilitate tests by adding special conditions to their code. The block of code that is executed depending on the current user's name is usually only intended for the developer him-/herself.
Although developer guidelines almost always include the obligation to make use of AUTHORITY-CHECKs, these checks might interfere with functional tests – and people might want to circumvent them (just for the tests, of course). No matter what the intention was, this approach leads to programs that do authorization checks for all users – except for the developer of the code... bad thing!
The following code snippet is probably one of the most prominent examples:
IF sy-uname <> 'DEVELOPER'. AUTHORITY-CHECK ... ENDIF.
Right after the successful test phase, the code is transported to production and the conditional code might never be made universal...
If we consider malicious behavior, such code is called a backdoor and/or hidden function and this means that there is a need for action (at least to protect your developer colleagues)!
How to detect it
To find affected code, the SAP standard report RS_ABAP_SOURCE_SCAN is of great help — you can use it to search for plain strings or expressions in reports, classes, etc.
Since we're interested in IF conditions that check the value of SY-UNAME, I'd suggest to search using "IF .*sy-uname" as the expression and tick the checkbox "String is standard expression".
In the sample below, I limited the code to search in to programs with name Z*, but you might probably want to adjust this according to your needs (e.g. your registered namespaces).
The result shows two different conditions that use SY-UNAME in a possibly evil way:
The search expression above is rather straight forward...
Unfortunately, it can be tricked easily by a developer, who knows it:
DATA: foobar TYPE syuname. foobar = sy-uname. * Obfuscated condition IF foobar <> 'MYSELF'. AUTHORITY-CHECK ... ENDIF.
So – when you establish controls to prevent the usage of user-based conditions, this is something to keep in mind.
Humans are usually better at detecting fuzzy patterns that computers are...
Code that is bypassed based on the value of SY-UNAME should never be used!
All instances of hard-coded user names in customer code used on productive systems should be corrected.
Controls should be established to prevent such code from being transported.
You might want to integrate the use of the SAP code inspector into your transport process.